wAbstract
@Transboundary water pollution is a persistent problem in China.
This study proposes a Model of Transfer Tax (MTT) which incorporates
a typical Stackelberg game between administrator and individual
region of a river basin. The MMT model considers the geographic
structure of a river basin and can be used to compute an optimal
pollutant transfer tax rate. Given the tax rate, an individual
region can decide its optimal pollution reduction. The transfer
tax rate served as an ecological compensation standard that enhances
cooperation on pollution reduction among the regions, achieving
the minimum pollution reduction cost for the whole river basin.
Keywords: Transboundary water pollution; River basin; Pollutant
reduction cost; Transfer tax; Game modelx
1. Introduction
2. Literature review
@2.1. A description of the geographical structure of a river
basin
3. A game model of transfer tax
4. Case study: the Huaihe River Basin
5. Conclusion
Acknowledgments
References