Yi,W.-J., Zou,L.-L., Guo,J., Wang,K. and Wei,Y.-M.(2011): How can China reach its CO2 intensity reduction targets by 2020? - A regional allocation based on equity and development. Energy Policy, 39, 2407-2415.

『中国は2020年までにその二酸化炭素強度削減目標をいかに達成できるか?−公正かつ発展的な地域割当』


Abstract
 In late 2009, the Chinese government committed to cut its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 40% to 45% of 2005 levels by 2020. This has raised the issue of how to allocate the CO2 reduction target regionally to meet the national reduction target. To meet this objective, the following aspects may be taken into consideration: equity principles, ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’; intensity reduction target fulfillment; and economic difference and reduction potential among provinces. This paper selects per capita GDP, accumulated fossil fuel related CO2 emissions and energy consumption per unit of industrial added value as indicators for emission reduction capacity, responsibility and potential, respectively. Based on these three indicators, a comprehensive index is developed and an intensity allocation model constructed. As decision makers may have different preferences when allocating the reduction burden, we allocate different weights to the indicators, analyzing the results using cluster analysis. The following aspects may also be considered together with the national regional development strategy to determine how to share the burden: the reduction potential of various regions; implementation potential of the plans; and promotion of a highly efficient low carbon economic development model.

Keywords: CO2 intensity; Equity; Reduction target allocation』

1. Introduction
2. Indicator selection and allocation method of China's intensity reduction target
 2.1. Definition of the equity principles
 2.2. Basic assumptions
 2.3. Comprehensive index construction
 2.4. Allocation of China's 2020 intensity reduction target
 2.5. Data source and processing
3. Results and discussion
 3.1. Intensity reduction target allocation to provinces
 3.2. Preferring capacity
 3.3. Preferring responsibility
 3.4. Preferring potential
4. Conclusions and policy implications
Acknowledgements
Appendix A
Appendix B
References


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