『Abstract
The question over whether resource abundance or scarcity is an
important cause of conflict has been a lively area of research.
We examine this question in a simple trade-theoretic model where
two regions are in conflict and where war equilibrium is determined
endogenously. We find that while abundance of uncontested natural
resources discourages conflict (the Malthusian view), abundance
of contested natural resources encourages conflict. We also show
that when the warring regions have influence over the terms of
trade and take this influence into account when deciding war efforts,
the effect of endowments on conflict may be strengthened or weakened
depending on factor intensities of production and the relative
strength of income and substitution effects.
Keywords: War; Trade; Nash equilibrium; Disputed resources; Undisputed
resources; Terms of trade.』
1. Introduction
2. Model and initial analysis
3. Resources and war: the case of small open economies
4. The case of large open economies
5. Conclusion
References