(Acknowledgments)

『Abstract
　It is striking how often countries with oil or other natural resource wealth have failed to grow more rapidly than those without. This is the phenomenon known as the Natural Resource Curse. The principle is not confined to individual anecdotes or case studies, but has been borne out in econometric tests of the determinants of economic performance across a comprehensive sample of countries. The paper considers six aspects of commodity wealth, each of interest in its own right, but each also a channel that some have suggested could lead to sub-standard economic performance. They are: long-term trends in world commodity prices, volatility, crowding out of manufacturing, civil war, poor institutions, and the Dutch Disease. The paper concludes with a consideration of promising ideas for institutions that could help a country that is rich in, say, oil overcome the pitfalls of the Curse and achieve good economic performance. They include indexation of oil contracts, hedging of export proceeds, denomination of debt in terms of oil, Chile-style fiscal rules, a monetary target that emphasizes product prices, transparent commodity funds, and lump-sum distribution.』

Outline
The resource curse: Introduction
I. Long-term trends in world commodity prices
　a. The determination of the export price on world markets
　b. The hypothesis of a declining trend in commodity prices (Prebisch)
　c. Hypotheses of rising trends in non-renewable resource prices (Malthus and Hotelling)
　　i. Hotelling and the interest rate
　　ii. Malthusianism and the “peak oil” hypothesis
　d. Evidence
　　i. Statistical time series studies
　　ii. The wager of Paul Ehrlich against Julian Simon
II. Medium-term volatility of prices for oil and other commodities
　a. Low short-run elasticities
　b. Is volatility per se detrimental to economic performance?
III. The natural resource curse and possible channels
　a. Is commodity specialization per se detrimental to growth?
　b. Do mineral riches lead to wars?
　c. Institutions
　　i. Institutions, governance, and development
　　ii. Oil, institutions and governance
　d. Oil and democracy
IV. The Dutch disease and procyclicality
　a. The macroeconomics of the Dutch Disease
　b. Procyclicality
　c. The procyclicality of capital flows to developing countries
　d. The procyclicality of fiscal policy
V. Policy solutions
　a. Institutions that were supposed to stabilize but have not worked
　　i. Marketing boards
　　ii. Other government stockpiles
　　iii. Producer subsidies
　　iv. Price controls for consumers
　　v. OPEC and other international cartels
　b. Devices to share risks
　　i. Price setting in contracts with foreign companies
　　ii. Hedging in commodity futures markets
　　iii. Denomination of debt in terms of commodity prices
　c. Monetary policy
　　i. Fixed vs. floating exchange rates
　　ii. Alternative nominal anchors
　d. Institutions to make national saving procyclical
　　i. Rules for the budget deficit: The example of Chile
　　ii. Commodity funds or sovereign wealth funds
　　iii. Reserve accumulation by central banks
　　iv. Reducing net private capital inflows during booms
　　v. Lump sum distribution
　e. Efforts to impose external checks
VI. Summary
References