『(Abstract)
The ‘resource curse’ hypothesis claims that abundance in natural
resources, particularly oil, encourages especially civil war.
Natural resources provide both motive and opportunity for conflict
and create indirect institutional and economic causes of instability.
Contrarily, the theory of the rentier state - largely neglected
in the study of peace and war in this respect - suggests that
regimes use revenue from abundant resources to buy off peace through
patronage, large-scale distributive policies and effective repression.
Consequently, such rentier states would tend to be more stable
politically and less prone to conflict. These two theories thus
imply ambivalent effects of resource abundance on conflict proneness.
This article presents part of a solution to this apparent puzzle
for the case of oil-producing countries. The key argument is that
both resource wealth per capita and resource dependence need to
be taken into account, since only the availability of very high
per capita revenues from oil allows governments to achieve internal
stability. The empirical analysis supports this hypothesis. The
findings of multivariate cross-country regressions indicate a
U-shaped relationship between oil dependence and civil war onset,
while high resource wealth per capita tends to be associated with
less violence. The results of a macro-qualitative comparison for
a reduced sample of highly dependent oil exporters are even more
clearcut. Using the same reduced sample, we find that oil-wealthy
countries apparently manage to maintain political stability by
a combination of large-scale distribution, high spending on the
security apparatus and protection by outsiders. Compared to oil-poor
countries and in contradiction to the rentier state theory, the
institutions of oil-wealthy countries do not seem to be particularly
characterized by patronage and clientelism.』
Introduction
The resource curse: A negative effect of natural resources on
peace
The rentier state: A stabilizing effect of revenues from natural
resources
Resources and conflict: Empirical evidence to date
Hypotheses and empirical strategy
Assessing the effect of oil wealth per capita on civil war onset
Multivariate analysis
Macro-qualitative analysis
Testing for causal mechanisms
Conclusions
References