『Abstract
　Petroleum-related aid programmes and projects are a key part of donor activities in oil-rich developing countries. This paper critically assesses petroleum-related aid activities, using the Norwegian Oil for Development programme as a main case. Recent research suggests that institutions, or governance, are essential in averting a resource curse. While governance issues are beginning to receive more attention in these types of programmes, they still form a minor part of programme activities. The narrow sector focus that characterizes petroleum-related aid makes it unlikely that it will produce the higher order institutional changes needed to lift the resource curse. Petroleum-related aid activities address the issue of corruption only to a limited extent. Given the commercial and political interests of donor countries, questions about the integrity and credibility of these types of programmes can be raised.

Keywords: Natural resources; Institutions; Petroleum-related aid』

1. Introduction
2. Why is there a resource curse?
　2.1. Four resource curse perspectives
　　2.1.1. Dutch disease
　　2.1.2. Rent-seeking
　　2.1.3. Patronage
　　2.1.4. Destruction of institutions
　2.2. Empirical evidence: Curse is conditional on institutions
　2.3. Policy implications: Which institutions matter?
3. Petroleum-related aid and corruption
　3.1. Donors and corruption: The state of the art
4. Petroleum-related aid and the resource curse
　4.1. The Norwegian oil for development programme
　4.2. The institutional focus of the oil for development programme
　4.3. Anti-corruption activities of the oil for development programme
　4.4. Integrity and motivation of the oil for development programme
　4.5. Petroleum-related aid activities of other donors
5. Conclusion
Appendix 1. Oil for Development country allocations 2007-2008
References