『(Abstract)
　Countless studies document the correlation between abundant mineral resources and a series of negative economic and political outcomes, including poor economic performance, unbalanced growth, weakly institutionalized states, and authoritarian regimes across the developing world. The disappointing experience of mineral-rich countries has generated a large body of scholarship aimed at explaining this empirical correlation and a list of prescriptions for combating the resource curse. The most popular solutions emphasize macroeconomic policies, economic diversification, natural resource funds, transparency and accountability, and direct distribution to the general population. The success of these solutions has been limited because they either presuppose strong state institutions, which are widely absent in the developing world, or assume state ownership over mineral wealth and thus the need for external actors to constrain the state. At the same time, domestic private ownership is rarely proposed and often maligned. Yet, in some countries, it would serve as a more viable way to avoid the resource curse by fostering institutions that more effectively constrain state leaders, encouraging them to invest in institution building, and enabling them to respond more successfully to commodity booms and busts.』

（Introduction)
The paradox of mineral wealth
　Windfalls and economic growth
　Volatility and economic growth
　Political consequences of reliance on external rents
Proposed solutions and their limitations
　Fiscal and monetary policy
　Economic diversification
　Natural resource funds
　Transparency, accountability, and public involvement
　Direct distribution
The missing link: Private ownership and state capacity
　Why ownership matters
Conclusion
Notes
References