Contents Page
Executive Summary 3
1. Introduction 5
2. A History of Interest in Resource Impact 5
@2.1 Conclusion 7
3. The Presence of Resource Curse 7
@3.1 Conclusion 9
4. The Transmission Mechanism Between Large Resource Revenues
And Poor Performance 10
@4.1 Long Term Decline in Terms of Trade 10
@4.2 Revenue Volatility 10
@4.3 Dutch Disease 11
@4.4 Crowding Out Effects 13
@4.5 Increasing the Role of The State 13
@@4.5.1 General Issues 13
@@4.5.2 Bad Decision Making 13
@@4.5.3 Enhances Corruption and Rent Seeking 14
@@4.5.4 The Nature of Investment Decisions 15
@@4.5.5. Industrial Policy 15
@4.6 Socio-cultural and political impacts 16
@4.7 Conclusion 18
5. How Might Resource Curse be Avoided - The Theory and the
Practice 18
@5.1 Leave it in the Ground 18
@5.2 Diversification 19
@5.3 Revenue Sterilisation 20
@5.4 Stabilisation and Oil Funds 20
@5.5 Investment Policy 22
@5.6 Political Reforms Needed to Carry out the Corrective Politics
22
6. Conclusion 24
Bibliography 25
1. INTRODUCTION
Common sense and economic theory argue that large revenues from
natural resources should generate wealth. Yet much evidence suggests
the opposite and that such countries suffer from gresource curseh.
The paper provides a survey of the growing academic literature
on the impact of natural resources on an economy.
2. A HISTORY OF INTEREST IN RESOURCE IMPACT
The topic has long attracted interest from a variety of sources.
Initially this was focussed on primary products generally, but
after the oil shocks of the 1970s, attention switched to the impact
on oil exporters. An interest that subsequently extended to other
minerals. More recently interest has revived and attracted a wider
audience due to growing pressure from a variety of NGOfs. This
has produced a number of results. The World Bank has instituted
an gExtractive Industry Reviewh to consider the Groupfs role in
such projects. The more responsible multinationals are also looking
at the impact of such projects and how to mitigate negative consequences.
These concerns are heightened because a number of countries are
about to receive large oil and mineral revenues and are therefore
vulnerable. Also those financing such projects are concerned that
negative impacts will threaten the viability of the projects themselves.
3. THE PRESENCE OF RESOURCE CURSE
There is a large body of empirical work that tries to establish
a negative relationship between resource abundance and poor economic
performance. For the most part this evidence appears to support
the gresource curseh hypothesis. However, such work is not without
criticism. The results are very sensitive to the period chosen.
How gnatural resourcesh are defined is also important. The methodology
used also attracts
criticism from some quarters. Apart from the negative impact on
economic performance, the impact on poverty also attracts attention,
as does the tendency of resource abundance to create conflict
and to retard political change. However, despite fairly compelling
evidence of the presence of gresource curseh, the literature also
asserts that some countries managed to avoid it and instead receive
a gblessingh. A recent study attempts to establish which these
countries might be and concludes that some mineral rich countries
have succeeded. Thus the paper argues for dropping the term gresource
curseh and instead using the term resource impact and then determining
whether it was a curse or a blessing.
4. THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM BETWEEN LARGE RESOURCE REVENUES
AND POOR PERFORMANCE
There exists a huge literature on why countries might suffer gresource
curseh. The paper considers six transmission mechanisms . a long-term
decline in terms of trade; revenue volatility; Dutch disease;
crowding out effects; increasing the role of the state; and finally
the socio-cultural and political impacts. The paper considers
the literature in each of these areas. The increasing role of
the state in addition to general issues, considers bad decision-making,
enhanced corruption and rent seeking, the nature of investment
decisions, and industrial policy. Socio-cultural and political
impacts considers why the apparently successful policies to avoid
problems were actually undertaken by the political and bureaucratic
institutions. Much of the discussion concerns the nature of rentier
societies, the nature of regimes and in particular the role of
gdevelopmental statesh versus gpredatory statesh.
A clear conclusion from this section is that there is no simple
single explanation of what creates a gblessingh rather than a
gcurseh. Nor is there any agreement on any collection of explanations.
This argues for a caseby-case approach rather than trying to force
some sort of generalization and adds support to the argument to
substitute the term gresource impacth for gresource curseh and
then evaluate the nature of the impact. Another aspect is making
the distinction between macro-economic policy that may aggravate
or avoid problems and why that particular policy was followed
in the first place. Thus it is not just what the transmission
mechanisms were but why they were allowed to operate (or not as
the case may be). This lack of clarity on the transmission mechanisms
presents a serious challenge. If it is not clear what causes the
problem, then treatment is likely to prove equally elusive.
5. HOW NEGATIVE IMPACTS MIGHT BE AVOIDED . THE THEORY AND THE
PRACTISE
This section considers what policy decisions the governments actually
made and why they made those decisions and not others. Various
options to avoid problems are analysed. These include - not developing
the mineral deposits; diversifying the economy away from dependence
on oil, gas and mineral exports; sterilizing the incoming revenue;
the use of stabilization and oil funds; and finally reconsidering
investment policies. The section finishes by assessing what political
reforms might be needed to carry out the necessary policies. This
involves two possible strands. The first is to develop democracy
although the evidence suggests this is far from being a necessary
condition. The other strand is the need to remove corruption and
contain rent seeking. The issue of transparency as an aid in this
process is also considered. The importance of the presence of
a hdevelopmental stateh is emphasised together with the need for
an alignment of interests within the society. Of particular importance
is the institutional capacity of the society to translate a developmental
ideology into effective policies.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Clearly the whole issue of what causes a gcurseh rather than a
gblessingh and how to enjoy the latter and avoid the former is
an extremely complex issue. The literature is divided on both
causes and cures although there is a growing consensus that essentially
it is something to do with governance and the answer lies more
in political economy than macro-economic analysis. Hence the key
question is not what was done? It is why
was it done?
Several further areas of study are identified: -