Foreword
Acknowledgements
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Boxes
『Executive
Summary
Energy
Security in a Dangerous World
World Energy Outlook 2004 paints a sobering picture
of how the global energy system is likely to evolve from now to
2030. If governments stick with the policies in force as of
mid-2004, the world's energy needs will be almost 60% higher in
2030 than they are now. Fossil fuels will continue to dominate
the global energy mix, meeting most of the increase in overall
energy use. The shares of nuclear power and renewable energy sources
will remain limited.
The Earth's energy resources are more than adequate to meet
demand until 2030 and well beyond. Less certain is how much it
will cost to extract them and deliver them to consumers. Fossil-fuel
resources are, of
course, finite, but we are far from exhausting them. The world
is not running out of oil just yet. Most estimates of proven oil
reserves are high enough to meet the cumulative world demand we
project over the next three decades. Our analysis suggests that
global production of conventional oil will not peak before 2030
if the necessary investments are made. Proven reserves of gas
and coal are even more plentiful that those of oil. There is considerable
potential for discovering more of all these fuels in the future.
But serious concerns about energy security emerge from the
market trends projected here. The world's vulnerability to
supply disruptions will increase as international trade expands.
Climate-destabilising carbon-dioxide emissions will continue to
rise, calling into question the sustainability of the current
energy system. Huge amounts of new energy infrastructure will
need to be financed. And many of the world's poorest people will
still be deprived of modern energy services. These challenges
call for urgent and decisive action by governments around the
world.
A central message of this Outlook is that short-term
risks to energy security will grow. Recent geopolitical developments
and surging energy prices have brought that message dramatically
home. Major oil- and gas importers
- including most OECD countries, China and India - will become
ever more dependent on imports from distant, often politically-unstable
parts of the world. Flexibility of oil demand and supply will
diminish. Oil use will become ever more concentrated in transport
uses in the absence of readily available substitutes. Rising oil
demand will have to be met by a small group of countries with
large reserves, primarily Middle East members of OPEC and Russia.
Booming trade will strengthen the mutual dependence among exporting
and importing countries. But it will also exacerbate the risks
that wells or pipelines could be closed or tankers blocked by
piracy, terrorist attacks or accidents. Rapid worldwide growth
in natural gas consumption and trade will foster similar concerns.
If current government policies do not change, energy-related
emissions of carbon dioxide will grow marginally faster than energy
use. CO2 emissions will be more than
60% higher in 2030 than now. The average carbon content of energy,
which fell markedly during the past three decades, will hardly
change. Well over two-thirds of the projected increase in emissions
will come from developing countries, which will remain big users
of coal - the most carbon-intensive of fuels. Power stations,
cars and trucks will give off most of the increased energy-related
emissions.
Converting the world's resources into available supplies will
require massive investments. In some cases, financing for new
infrastructure will be hard to come by. Meeting projected
demand will entail cumulative investment of some $16 trillion
from 2003 to 2030, or $568 billion per year. The electricity sector
will absorb the majority of this investment. Developing countries,
where production and demand are set to increase most, will require
about half of global energy investment. Those countries will face
the biggest challenge in raising finance, because their needs
are larger relative to the size of their economies and because
the investment risks are bigger. The global financial system has
the capacity to fund the required investments, but it will not
do so unless conditions are right.
Reducing energy poverty is an urgent necessity. There
will be some encouraging advances in energy development in non-OECD
countries over the projection period. But even for the most developed
among them in energy terms, the use of modern energy and the per
capita consumption of every kind of energy will remain far below
that of OECD countries. Little progress will be made in reducing
the total number of people who lack access to electricity. And
the ranks of those using traditional fuels in unsustainable and
inefficient ways for cooking and heating will actually increase
over the projection period. Developing countries are unlikely
to see their incomes and living standards increase without improved
access to modern energy services.
These trends, from our Reference Scenario, are, however, not
unalterable. More vigorous government action could steer
the world onto a markedly different energy path. This Outlook
presents an Alternative Scenario, which analyses, for the first
time, the global impact of environmental and energy-security policies
that countries around the world are already considering, as well
as the effects of faster deployment of energy-efficient technologies.
In this scenario, global energy demand and carbon-dioxide emissions
are significantly lower than in our Reference Scenario. Dependence
on imported energy in major consuming countries and the worlds
reliance on Middle East oil and gas are also lower. However, even
in this Alternative Scenario energy imports and emissions would
still be higher in 2030 than today.
It is clear from our analysis that achieving a truly sustainable
energy system will call for technological breakthroughs that radically
alter how we produce and use energy. The government actions
envisioned in our
Alternative Scenario could slow markedly carbon-dioxide emissions,
but they could not reduce them significantly using existing technology.
Carbon capture and storage technologies, which are not taken into
account in either the Reference or the Alternative Scenario, hold
out the tantalising prospect of using fossil fuels in a carbon-free
way. Advanced nuclear-reactor designs or breakthrough renewable
technologies could one day help free us from our dependence on
fossil fuels. This is unlikely to happen within the timeframe
of our analysis. The pace of technology development and deployment
in these and other areas is the key to making the global energy
system more economically, socially and environmentally sustainable
in the long term. But consumers will have to be willing to pay
the full cost of energy - including environmental costs - before
these technologies can become competitive. Governments must decide
today to accelerate this process.
Main Findings and Projections
Fossil Fuels will Still Meet most
of the World's Energy Needs
World primary energy demand in the Reference Scenario
is projected to expand by almost 60% between 2002 and 2030.
But the projected annual rate of demand growth, at 1.7%, is slower
than the average of the past three decades, which was 2%. Energy
intensity - the amount of energy needed to produce a dollar's
worth of GDP - will continue to decline as energy efficiency improves
and the global economy relies less on heavy industry.
Fossil fuels will continue to dominate global energy use,
accounting for some 85% of the increase in world primary
demand. Oil will remain the single largest fuel in the primary
energy mix, even though its percentage share will fall marginally.
Among the fossil fuels, demand for natural gas will grow most
rapidly, mainly due to strong demand from power generators. The
share of coal will fall slightly, but coal will remain the leading
fuel for generating electricity. Nuclear power's share will decline
during the Outlook period.
Two-thirds of the increase in global energy demand will come
from developing countries. By 2030, they will account for
almost half of total demand, in line with their more rapid economic
and population growth. More households will live in towns and
cities and so will be better placed to gain access to energy services.
The developing countries' share of global demand will increase
for all of the primary energy sources except non-hydro renewables.
Their share of nuclear-power production will increase fastest,
because of strong growth in China and other parts of Asia. Their
share of coal consumption will also increase sharply, mainly because
of booming demand in China and India.
Oil-Supply Patterns will Shift as Demand
and Trade Grow
Global primary oil demand is projected to grow by 1.6%
per year, reaching 121 mb/d in 2030. Demand will continue
to grow most quickly in developing countries. Most of the increase
in world oil demand will come from the transport sector. Oil will
face little competition from other fuels in road, sea and air
transportation during the projection period. OPEC countries, mainly
in the Middle East, will meet most of the increase in global demand.
By 2030, OPEC will supply over half of the world's oil needs -
an even larger share than in the 1970s. Net inter-regional oil
trade will more
than double, to over 65 mb/d in 2030 - a little more than half
of total oil production. Huge investments will be needed in oil
fields, tankers, pipelines and refineries, $3 trillion from 2003
to 2030. Most upstream investment will, in fact, offset production
declines from already-producing fields. Financing will be a major
challenge.
The International Energy Agency calls on all parties to work
together to devise and implement a universally-recognised, transparent,
consistent and comprehensive data-reporting system for oil and
gas reserves. The reliability of reserves data reported by
oil companies has been called into severe question. Doubts about
the accuracy of reserve estimates - an issue highlighted in this
Outlook - could undermine investor confidence and slow
investment. Governments should be concerned about reserves-data
problems, since the long-term security of energy supplies depends
on the timely development of oil and gas reserves. The future
availability and affordability of hydrocarbons affect decisions
about what new policies and measures governments ought to adopt
now to develop alternative sources of energy and to save energy.
As international trade expands, risks will grow of a supply
disruption at the critical choke points through which oil must
flow. A total of 26 million barrels currently pass through
the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Malacca
in Asia every day. Traffic through these and other vital channels
will more than double over the projection period. A disruption
in supply at any of these points could have a severe impact on
oil markets. Maintaining the security of international sea-lanes
and pipelines will take on added urgency.
Future trends in oil prices are a major source of uncertainty.
Prices of crude oil and refined products have risen sharply since
1999, hitting all-time highs in nominal terms in mid-2004. In
a special analysis of sustained high oil
prices, we have assumed that the price of crude oil imported into
IEA countries would average $35 per barrel (in year-2000 dollars)
from now to 2030 - about $10 more than in our Reference Scenario.
In this high price case, global oil
demand falls by 15%, or 19 mb/d in 2030, an amount almost equal
to total US oil consumption today. Conventional and non-conventional
oil production outside OPEC countries increases markedly at the
$35 price, causing OPEC's market share to fall considerably. Cumulative
OPEC revenues in 2003-2030 are about $750 billion, or 7% lower,
than in the Reference Scenario. Plainly, OPEC would not benefit
from higher prices in the long term.
Demand for Natural Gas will Overtake
that for Coal
Worldwide consumption of natural gas will almost double
by 2030, overtaking that of coal within the next decade. Gas
demand is projected to grow most rapidly in Africa, Latin America
and developing Asia. Yet the total volume increase in demand will
be bigger in the mature markets of OECD North America, OECD Europe
and the transition economies, where per capita gas use is much
higher. Most of the increase in gas demand will come from power
stations. Gas is often preferred to coal in new thermal plants
for its environmental advantages, its lower capital costs and
operational flexibility. Gas-to-liquids plants will emerge as
a new market for natural gas, making use of reserves located far
from traditional markets and meeting rising demand for cleaner
oil products.
Gas reserves are easily large enough to meet the projected
increase in global demand. Additions to proven reserves have
outpaced production by a wide margin since the 1970s. Production
will increase most in Russia and in the Middle East, which between
them hold most of the world's proven gas reserves. Most of the
incremental output in these regions will be exported to North
America, Europe and Asia, swelling the surge in international
energy trade. All regions that are currently net importers of
gas will see their imports rise, and a growing number of countries
and regions will become net importers for the first time. Liquefied
natural gas, the bulk of which will be used for power generation,
will account for most of the increase in traded gas. By 2030,
just over half of all inter-regional gas trade will be in the
form of LNG, up from 30% at present. OPEC countries will continue
to dominate the supply of LNG. Cumulative investment needs for
gas-supply infrastructure to 2030 will amount to $2.7 trillion,
or about $100 billion per year from now to 2030. More than half
will be for exploration and development of gas fields.
Even though coal's share of the global energy market will
drop slightly over the Outlook period, coal will continue
to play a key role in the world energy mix. In 2030, coal
will meet 22% of all energy needs, essentially the same proportion
as today. Virtually all the increase in coal consumption will
be for power generation, and coal will remain that sector's main
fuel - despite a loss of market share to natural gas. Coal demand
will increase most in developing Asian countries. China and India
alone will be responsible for 68% of the increase in demand over
the period 2002 to 2030. Demand growth in the OECD will be minimal.
Carbon-free Energy Sources will Meet
only a Small Part of Surging Electricity Needs
World electricity demand is expected to double between now
and 2030, with most of the growth occurring in developing countries.
By 2030, power generation will account for nearly half of world
consumption of natural gas. It will also have absorbed over 60%
of total investment in energy supply infrastructure between now
and then. The global power sector will need about 4 800 GW of
new capacity to meet the projected increase in electricity demand
and to replace ageing infrastructure. In total, electricity investment
will amount to about $10 trillion, more than $5 trillion of that
amount for developing countries alone. For many of them, investment
will need to increase substantially. The electricity-supply industry
is set for further restructuring and more far-reaching regulatory
reforms. Reforms in the
OECD have yielded positive results, but many challenges remain
to be met. Blackouts in 2003 and 2004 highlighted the importance
of adequate reserve margins, the need to improve the resilience
of networks and the importance of
providing adequate regulatory incentives for investment.
Worldwide nuclear capacity is projected to increase slightly,
but the share of nuclear power in total electricity generation
will decline. A substantial amount of capacity will be added,
but this will be mostly offset by
reactor retirements. Three-quarters of existing nuclear capacity
in OECD Europe is expected to be retired by 2030, because reactors
will have reached the end of their life or because governments
plan to phase out nuclear power.
Nuclear power generation will increase in a number of Asian countries,
notably in China, South Korea, Japan and India.
Renewable energy sources as a whole will increase their share
of electricity generation. The share of hydroelectricity will
fall, but the shares of other renewables in electricity generation
will triple, from 2% in 2002
to 6% in 2030. Most of the increase will be in wind and biomass.
Wind power will be the second-largest renewable source of electricity
in 2030, after hydroelectricity. Finding good sites for land-based
wind turbines is becoming more difficult in some areas. The largest
increases in renewables will occur in OECD Europe, where they
enjoy strong government backing.
Russian Oil and Gas Exports are Poised
for Further Growth in the Near Term
Russia will play a central role in global energy supply
and trade over the Outlook period, with major implications
for the world's energy security. The Russian energy sector
has undergone a dramatic transformation
in recent years. It has been the principal force behind the country's
economic recovery since the late 1990s. The Russian economy's
dependence on the oil and gas sectors has grown in recent years.
Russia's long-term economic prospects hinge on improving the competitiveness
and diversity of its other manufacturing sectors and internationally
traded services.
The prospects for Russian oil production are very uncertain.
Oil production has surged in recent years, mainly thanks to the
rehabilitation of existing wells to enhance the recovery of reserves.
Production is projected to continue its increase, though more
slowly than in recent years. In the short to medium term, most
of the extra production will be exported. But the share of Russian
exports in world trade will fall after 2010, as Russian production
stabilises, domestic demand expands and output picks up in the
Middle East.
Russia's huge gas resources will underpin a continued increase
in production. Higher output will not only meet rising domestic
demand, but also provide increased exports to Europe and to new
markets in Asia. Russia will still be the world's biggest gas
exporter in 2030. But output from the country's old super-giant
fields is declining, and huge investments
in greenfield projects will be needed to replace them. The prospects
of independent producers contributing more gas - and thereby allowing
Russia to increase exports - will depend on whether Gazprom's
network is effectively opened to them.
Developing Russia's huge energy resources, modernising existing
infrastructure and improving efficiency will call for enormous
investments. A stable and predictable business regime and
market reforms are urgently required if these investments are
to be financed. If gas-sector reform is delayed, worries about
the security of future supply will increase. Large amounts of
foreign capital are unlikely to be made available for energy projects
that are not aimed at export markets.
Expanding Modern Energy Services in
Poor Countries Will Remain Vital to Their Prospects for Development
Energy is a prerequisite to economic development. The
prosperity that economic development brings, in turn, stimulates
demand for more and better energy services. Energy services
also help to meet such basic human needs as food and shelter.
They contribute to social development by improving education and
public health. Electricity plays a particularly important role
in human development. Most developed countries have established
a virtuous
circle of improvements in energy infrastructure and economic growth.
But in the world's poorest countries, the process has barely got
off the ground.
Electrification rates will rise over the projection period,
but the total number of people still without electricity
will fall only slightly, from 1.6 billion in 2002 to just under
1.4 billion in 2030. Most of the net decrease in the number
of people without electricity will occur only after 2015. The
ranks of the electricity-deprived will fall in Asia, but will
continue to swell in Africa. Access to electricity will remain
easier in urban areas, but the absolute
number of people without electricity will increase slightly in
towns and cities, while it will fall in the countryside. The number
of people using only traditional biomass for cooking and heating
in unsustainable ways will continue to grow, from just under 2.4
billion in 2002 to over 2.6 billion in 2030.
Developing countries can look forward to further advances
in energy and human development. According to the Energy Development
Index, which the IEA presents for the first time in this Outlook,
all developing regions can expect to experience increases in per
capita energy use and improved access to modern energy services
- including electricity. Yet only a few Middle East and Latin
American countries will have reached the stage of energy development
in 2030 that OECD countries had attained in 1971. Africa and South
Asia will remain far behind.
Our analysis suggests that halving the proportion of very
poor people will require much faster energy development than is
projected in our Reference Scenario. The UN's Millennium Development
Goals aim to reduce by 50% the proportion of people living on
less than a dollar a day between 2000 and 2015. We estimate that
this target will not be met unless access to electricity can be
provided to more than half-a-billion people who, according to
our Reference Scenario, will still lack it in 2015. To do that
would require about $200 billion of additional investment in electricity
supply.
Meeting the target also implies a need to expand the use of modern
cooking and heating fuels to 700 million more people by 2015 than
projected in our Reference Scenario.
Governments must act decisively to accelerate the transition
to modern fuels and to break the vicious circle of energy poverty
and human under-development in the world's poorest countries.
This will require increasing the availability and affordability
of commercial energy, particularly in rural areas. Good governance
in the energy sector and more generally will be critical to improving
both the quantity and quality of energy services. The rich industrialised
countries have clear economic and security interests in helping
developing countries along the energy-development path.
New Policies Could Achieve a More Sustainable
Energy System
This study presents a World Alternative Policy Scenario,
which depicts a more efficient and more environment-friendly energy
future than does the Reference Scenario. It analyses how global
energy trends could evolve were countries around the world to
implement a set of policies and measures that they are currently
considering or might reasonably be expected to adopt. These policies
would foster the faster deployment of more efficient
and cleaner technologies. In this scenario, global primary energy
demand would be about 10% lower in 2030 than in the Reference
Scenario. The reduction in demand for fossil fuels would be even
bigger, thanks largely to policies that promote renewable energy
sources.
Demand for oil would be markedly lower than in the Reference
Scenario. Global oil demand would be 12.8 mb/d, or 11%, lower
in 2030 - an amount equal to the current combined production of
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Nigeria. Stronger measures
to improve fuel economy in OECD countries and the faster deployment
of more efficient
vehicles in non-OECD countries would contribute almost two-thirds
of these savings in 2030. Oil-import dependence in the OECD countries
and China would drop as a result. Coal demand would fall even
more in percentage terms - by 24% in 2030. The amount saved would
be around the current coal consumption of China and India combined.
World natural gas demand would be 10% lower than in the Reference
Scenario. Gas-import needs would be 40% lower in OECD North America
and 13% lower in Europe. China's gas imports would be higher,
after a shift from coal to gas.
By 2030, energy-related emissions of carbon dioxide would
be 16% lower than in the Reference Scenario. This is roughly
equal to the combined current emissions of the United States and
Canada. Almost 60% of the cumulative reduction of CO2
emissions would occur in non-OECD countries. In fact, OECD emissions
would level off by the 2020s, and then begin to decline.
More efficient use of energy in vehicles, electric appliances,
lighting and industry account for more than half of the reduction
in emissions. A shift in the power generation fuel mix in favour
of renewables and nuclear power
accounts for most of the rest.
The pattern of investment in energy supply and end-use equipment
in the Alternative Scenario is substantially different from that
in the Reference Scenario. The total amount of capital required
over the projection period for the entire energy chain - from
energy production to end use - does not differ much between the
two scenarios. Larger capital needs on the demand side would be
entirely offset by lower investment needs on the supply
side - despite a 14% increase in the capital intensity of electricity
supply in the Alternative Scenario. Electricity prices would rise
- for example, by 12% in the European Union. It is uncertain,
however, whether all the investment invoked in the Alternative
Scenario could actually be financed, especially in developing
countries. This is mainly because end-users, who would have to
invest more, are likely to find it harder to secure financing
than would suppliers, who would need to invest less.』
1.The
Context
The Methodological Approach
The Reference Scenario
Government Policies and Measures
Macroeconomic Factors
Population
Energy Prices
Technological Developments
The World Alternative Policy Scenario
Main Uncertainties
2.Global Energy Trends
Energy Demand
Primary Fuel Mix
Regional Trends
Sectoral Trends
Energy Production and Trade
Resource Availability and Production Prospects
Outlook for International Trade
Investment Outlook
Energy-Related CO2 Emissions
Overview
Regional Emission Trends
Sectoral Emission Trends
World Alternative Policy Scenario
3.Oil Market Outlook
Oil Demand
Oil Reserves and Resources
Classifying and Measuring Resources
Estimates of Proven Reserves
Turning Resources into Reserves
Oil Production
Summary of Projections
Conventional Oil Production Prospects by Region
Non-Conventional Oil Production Prospects
Inter-Regional Oil Trade
Investment Outlook
Implications of High Oil Prices
Background and Assumptions
Results
4.Natural Gas Market Outlook
Gas Demand
Gas Supply
Proven Reserves and Potential Resources
Production Prospects
Gas Trade
Investment Outlook
Price Developments
North America
Europe
Asia-Pacific
Regional Trends
North America
European Union
OECD Asia
OECD Oceania
Transition Economies
Developing Asia
Middle East
Africa
Latin America
5.Coal Market Outlook
Coal Demand
Sectoral Demand
Impact of Environmental Policy and Technology
Coal Reserves and Production
Proven Reserves
Production Prospects
Hard Coal Trade
Price Developments
Investment Outlook
Regional Trends
OECD North America
OECD Europe
OECD Pacific
China
India
Africa
Indonesia
6.Electricity Market Outlook
Electricity Demand
Drivers of Electricity Demand
Sectoral Growth
Power Generation
Choice of New Plant
The Electricity-Generation Mix
Technology Outlook
Impact on Fuel Markets
Capacity Requirements and Investment Outlook
CO2 Emissions
Electricity Markets and the Status of Reforms
Regional Trends
United States and Canada
European Union
OECD Pacific
China
India
Brazil
7.Renewable Energy Outlook
Renewable Energy Demand
Renewables in Power Generation
Cost Developments
Outlook by Source
Capacity and Investment Outlook
Renewables in Industry and Buildings
Biofuels
8.Regional Outlooks
OECD Regions and the EU
Overview
OECD North America
European Union
OECD Asia
OECD Oceania
Developing Countries
Developing Asia
China
India
Indonesia
Latin America
Brazil
Middle East
Africa
Transition Economies
9.Russia − an In-Depth Study
Energy Market Overview
Macroeconomic Context
Energy Policy Developments
Energy Demand Outlook
Overview
Sectoral Trends
Oil Supply Outlook
Resources
Crude Oil Production
Refining Capacity and Production
Export Prospects
Industry Structure and the Role of the State
Gas Supply Outlook
Resources and Production Trends
Export Prospects
Market Reforms
Coal Supply Outlook
Power and Heat Sector Outlook
Capacity Needs and Fuel Mix
Impact of Electricity Market Reforms
Implications of the Projections
Russia's Role in the Global Energy Market
Energy Investment Needs and Financing
Environmental Impact
10.Energy and Development
The Role of Energy in Development
Energy and Economic Growth
Energy and Human Development
The IEA Energy Development Index
Prospects for Energy Development
EDI Projections to 2030
Energy Development and the Millennium Goals
Policy Implications
Appendix to Chapter 10: Electrification Tables
11.World Alternative Policy Scenario
Background and Approach
Why an Alternative Scenario?
Methodology
Key results
Energy Demand
Implications for Energy Supply
Carbon-Dioxide Emissions
Investment Outlook
Results by Region
OECD Regions and the EU
Non-OECD Countries
Results by Sector
Power Generation
Transport
Industry
Residential and Services Sectors
Beyond the Alternative Policy Scenario
Appendix to Chapter 11:
Tables for World Alternative Policy Scenario Projections
Annex A Tables for Reference Scenario Projections
Annex B Energy Projections: Assessment and Comparison
Annex C World Energy Model 2004
Annex D The Precarious State of Energy Statistics
Annex E Definitions, Abbreviations and Acronyms
Annex F References
Figure 3.7: Hydrocarbon-Resource Classification Source: SPE/WPC/AAPG (2000). 〔OECD/IEA (2004): World Energy Outlook 2004. OECD/IEA, 570p.から〕 |